Not Just Voluntary Credits: Three CDR Demand Trends to Support and Scale
Recent discourse about CDR demand emphasizes uncertainty and scarcity. These concerns are real, but so are the demand signals already taking shape. If we support these signals now, they can create multiple paths forward for scaled CDR demand.
This brief spotlights three important demand trends already gaining traction: (1) credit purchasing, (2) demand for differentiated products, and (3) demand for products and services for which CDR is a by-product or co-product. For each trend, we share case studies that illustrate existing successes and how demand can be further scaled.
Introduction
CDR has moved fast this decade as researchers, entrepreneurs, and frontrunner buyers have challenged themselves to remove CO2 from the atmosphere and durably store it in geologic, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. They initiated research, formed companies, backed projects, and showed the world that there are many ways to do CDR, from mineralizing CO2 in concrete to electrochemically separating CO2 from the ocean.
CDR needs to go faster still. To achieve multi-gigaton scale CDR in 2050, the world will need more rapid deployment, testing, learning, and capacity-building across the portfolio of solutions. There are many types of CDR. Each has its own uncertainties, open questions, resource requirements, and constraints. If we clarify what works and build the capacity to deliver that at scale soon, we can narrow the gap to what is needed in 2050.
Deployment stalls without financing, and financing stalls without demand. Moving faster requires more project-level investment now. That could take the form of bankable offtake contracts, pre-purchases, or direct in-value-chain investments from more buyers. Over 80% of planned high-durability CDR capacity is at risk of not coming to fruition without additional offtake and financial commitments. CDR needs additional investment to scale quickly, keep up with needs, and ensure the gap between what is needed and what is possible does not grow.
Today’s demand signals are concentrated and uneven. Without strengthened demand, projects stall, companies fail, and progress slows. To date, the sector has mostly been driven by demand in the form of voluntary CDR credits. Voluntary corporate demand for CDR has begun to diversify beyond major tech companies, but it’s not likely to grow by orders of magnitude, and it may fall overall now that Microsoft has announced it will slow its purchases. Voluntary credits are and will remain essential, but a resilient CDR market will need multiple sources of demand as it scales.
Now is the time to test different business models and learn what works. Just as we do not know which technologies will prove to be scalable, we do not know what form the business models for those technologies will take. All creative business models, financing mechanisms, and demand drivers should be on the table right now.
We already see three promising CDR demand trends that merit more support:
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Credit purchasing through voluntary and policy-driven demand.
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Selling differentiated products that have a lower carbon intensity because CDR is embedded in the product value chain.
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“Flipping the script,” which means creating demand for processes where CDR is a by-product or co-product.
Below we highlight examples of where these trends are already working or, with additional effort, could create significant demand.
Widening the aperture on CDR demand
CDR demand is not just voluntary corporate credit purchasing. To widen the aperture on current and potential CDR demand we considered three key questions:
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Who is spending?
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Why are they spending?
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What are they spending on?
This reframing helps pinpoint where real demand signals exist today, and where targeted action can unlock additional demand.
Who is spending? Governments may directly spend on CDR through procurement or grants, or they could create financial incentives where they are paying part of the bill. Private sector actors span a variety of stakeholders from corporates buying credits to offset emissions, to industrial actors embedding CDR to decarbonize their facilities, to philanthropies purchasing CDR services for non-removal reasons (e.g., land conservancies focused on ecosystem restoration). Finally, some individuals may choose to purchase their own CDR credits or to spend money on lower-carbon products.
Why are they spending? There are a variety of motivations that a payer could have to spend on interventions that deliver CDR (achieve climate goals, adhere to a regulation, offset emissions, etc.). Four main categories encompass all these more detailed reasons to spend money, and include: voluntarily to manage emissions, voluntarily for a non-emissions purpose, in response to an emissions law or regulation, or in response to a non-emissions law or regulation. In short: Is the payer voluntarily spending money or are they doing so to comply with a law or regulation? And are they spending to manage emissions or for a different reason?
What are they spending on? Payers can trigger demand for CDR by purchasing a variety of products. The most discussed product is a CDR credit, or a verified, tradeable certificate that represents one metric ton of CO2 removed. However, other end products exist. For example, payers may finance a practice or service either for the purpose of doing CDR or for another goal that results in CDR as a by-product or co-product — what we described above as “flipping the script” (e.g., paying farmers to conduct enhanced rock weathering on farmland for pH management). In these instances, the payer is not buying a product but paying for a service: the CDR practice itself. Additionally, payers may purchase physical products with lower emissions intensity because of a CDR process. Examples of these could include:
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Purchasing the primary product of a CDR process (e.g., carbon molecules, timber building materials, biochar, low-carbon concrete, etc.)
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Purchasing byproducts of a CDR process (e.g., critical minerals, hydrogen, etc.).
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Purchasing products that have a lower carbon intensity because CDR was conducted “in-chain” alongside the production process (e.g., food products were produced on land in ways that also draw down carbon).
These three questions help illustrate the underlying drivers and mechanisms of demand and where there are underexplored opportunities. The remainder of this brief presents case studies that illustrate three different demand trends, identifying for each case study who is spending, why they are spending, and what they are spending on.
Major emerging CDR demand trends
Trend 1 – Governments and private sector actors are purchasing credits
Trend 1 is the most established: buyers purchasing CDR credits. That purchasing can be voluntary or driven by a compliance mechanism in which an entity’s emissions are being regulated and offsetting through CDR credits is allowed. This section highlights examples that are already stimulating CDR demand through credit purchasing.
AMCs for credits create demand signals by aggregating advance purchasing commitments across multiple stakeholders. They align members around shared procurement targets or standards, creating a demand signal for suppliers. Two leading examples of this are Frontier Climate and Symbiosis. Frontier Climate is a $1 billion commitment by multiple large corporations, including Stripe, Google, Meta, and others, to purchase carbon removal that is durable for 1,000 years or more. As of April 2026, over 1.8 million tons have been contracted and over 45,000 tons have been delivered under Frontier. Frontier utilizes both pre-purchases for early-stage pilots and offtake agreements for more mature deployments. Symbiosis, another example of an AMC, is a commitment by a different group of companies, including Google, Meta, Microsoft, and others, to contract up to 20 million tons of “nature-based carbon removals” by 2030. Symbiosis, started in 2024, is a newer AMC than Frontier Climate and announced its first project selection at the end of 2025.
While both of these examples are comprised of private sector buyers, governments could participate in AMCs too, and have done so in arenas outside of CDR, such as public health. See RMI’s report on a Government-Led Advance Market Commitment for CDR to learn more about how governments could build on existing private sector AMCs for CDR by launching a government-led one.
Government procurement programs for credits are also emerging within the larger trend of CDR credit purchasing. In 2024, Canada committed to purchasing at least CAD $10 million of CDR by 2030 through its Low-carbon Fuel Procurement Program (LCFPP). The government is specifically interested in purchasing credits generated by CDR projects that can help them meet the net-zero by 2050 commitment established under their Greening Government Strategy. In March 2026, Canada launched a Request for Standing Offer and will begin running competitive processes for several types of CDR in parallel.
While Canada is home to the most advanced example of a government procurement program for CDR credits, other governments have made progress towards acknowledging the importance of credit procurement in meeting emissions goals. For example, California SB 643, introduced in 2025, would have required the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to fund $50 million of CDR projects by 2035; however, it was vetoed after passing through the legislature because of budget constraints. Other jurisdictions (e.g., the United Kingdom, Massachusetts, and Switzerland) acknowledge that CDR will be needed to meet emissions goals but have not yet launched credit procurement programs.
Emissions trading systems create mandates for subject entities to retire allowances sufficient to cover their emissions. The primary way to comply is through decarbonization efforts or trading allowances with other covered entities. However, some ETSs allow offsets, which means there is an opportunity for CDR to be integrated and for ETSs to create demand for CDR credits. One example is the European Union (EU) ETS. Begun in 2005, this is the oldest cap-and-trade system and is designed to help the EU meet its climate targets, including to become climate-neutral by 2050 and to reduce its net emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. The ETS sets a cap on emissions, and companies in covered sectors must buy and sell allowances on the market to cover their emissions. CDR is not currently included in the ETS, meaning companies cannot purchase CDR credits through the ETS to comply with their emissions requirements; however, CDR integration is being considered by the European Commission. Additionally, other ETSs have committed to and started integrating CDR credits. The UK has committed to integrating specific types of CDR credits into its ETS, and Japan, through its Green Transformation ETS (GX-ETS), is allowing up to 5% of emissions to be covered by CDR credits.
Because ETSs set a cap on the emissions allowed from a company, they could also incentivize the addition of CDR practices in industrial processes, leading to lower-emissions products or facilities. Product differentiation is explored further in Trend 2, and it is important to note the role that ETSs have in catalyzing demand for differentiated products, even if most CDR integration to date has been through credit purchasing.
These examples have all focused on CDR credit purchasing, procurement, and trading, characterizing the first trend for CDR demand. While these examples are important, many others exist that do not rely on credit purchasing, which are underdiscussed and underutilized. Trends 2 and 3 explore these additional types of demand.
Trend 2 – Accounting for and regulating carbon intensities leads to demand for differentiated, lower-emissions products
Trend 2 is demand for differentiated, lower-emissions products, and it poses an opportunity for the CDR ecosystem to generate new demand. As governments and the private sector target embodied emissions across entire supply chains, product-level carbon accounting could become an enabler of CDR demand. Companies can distinguish their products and processes from competitors based on net emissions, and, in theory, this could be done by incorporating CDR into value chains. This section explores mechanisms that can translate product accounting for emissions into a demand lever for CDR.
Buy Clean policies require government purchasing of materials with lower embodied carbon emissions, including construction materials and other products. Buy Clean policies set a maximum threshold for the embodied emissions of materials and establish a government purchasing program for the resulting lower-emissions products. Because many low-carbon construction materials are produced all or in part using CDR methods, such as low-carbon concrete from ex-situ mineralization and low-carbon timber and insulation from residual biomass, Buy Clean policies can create demand for CDR processes by catalyzing demand for lower-emissions construction materials and other physical products. One example of this is Canada’s Greening Government Program, which requires the reduction of embodied carbon in government procurement, including in concrete.
Carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) are policy tools designed to protect domestic industries subject to climate regulation while incentivizing cleaner products globally. Under a CBAM, importers of emissions‑intensive goods are required to pay for the embodied emissions in those products. Done well, CBAMs could prevent carbon leakage beyond domestic borders by ensuring that imported goods face a carbon cost comparable to the cost placed on domestic production. The most advanced example is the European Union’s CBAM, which entered its transitional phase in 2023 and moves into its definitive regime in 2026. Importers of cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen must purchase certificates reflecting the carbon content of these goods, aligned with the carbon price faced by EU producers under the EU ETS. As a result, producers seeking access to EU markets have a clear incentive to reduce the emissions of their products to remain competitive.
In principle, CBAMs could create indirect demand for CDR if accounting frameworks allow removals to be recognized at the product level. For example, industrial producers could use CDR processes (e.g., mineralization of a stream of CO2 from direct air capture in cement production) to lower the emissions intensity of goods, thereby reducing liability under the CBAM. While current CBAM frameworks do not explicitly credit CDR, ongoing policy development around product‑level carbon accounting, verification, standards, and product labels could enable this integration over time, creating compliance‑driven demand signals for removals embedded in global supply chains.
Product standards create requirements or benchmarks for the performance of materials and products, often guiding industrial actors toward lower-emission alternatives. Actors align with standards by altering product design, manufacturing, or sourcing and obtaining certification that demonstrates adherence. One example is the UK’s SAF Mandate, which requires fuel suppliers within the UK to supply an increasing amount of SAF over time. Specifically, the SAF Mandate designates a percentage (increasing from 0.2% of jet fuel demand in 2028 to 3.5% in 2040) that must be power-to-liquid fuels, a type of SAF that can use captured atmospheric CO2 as the input source of carbon. Although the CO2 will be re-released into the atmosphere once the fuel is burned and so does not count as CDR, the SAF mandate and other product standards provide a potential demand source for processes and technologies like direct air capture that produce a stream of CO2 molecules for lower-emission products.
Product labeling for carbon intensity can catalyze demand for lower- or negative-emissions products by making embedded emissions visible and comparable when purchasers are making decisions. Labels translate complex supply-chain emissions data into simple signals that buyers can use to differentiate goods. When labels are credible and comparable across suppliers, they can trigger a shift in demand toward lower-intensity products and incent investment in CDR. In practice, product labels depend on robust product-level carbon accounting and on governance systems. For CDR, labeling creates a potential pathway for “in-chain” removals to matter commercially: producers that integrate removals into their supply chains may be able to claim lower carbon intensity, if standards recognize and verify CDR. Over time, product labeling can expand CDR demand by embedding demand signals directly in everyday purchasing and procurement.
Examples of product labeling already exist, although CDR integration is more theoretical. Environmental product declarations (EPDs) are already used in construction markets to disclose product-level lifecycle impacts, often including global warming potential, so purchasers can compare the embodied carbon of materials like concrete, steel, and insulation when making procurement decisions. As standards evolve to credibly account for in-chain removals, labels could become a direct channel for demand, rewarding producers who embed verified CDR into supply chains.
Trend 3 – CDR suppliers are flipping the script, delivering non-CDR value to buyers using CDR activities
Trend 3 flips the script: buyers purchase valuable goods or services, and removals occur alongside them. This is another emerging trend that can unlock new budgets, new sectors, and new geographies. Instead of only paying for removals, payers fund outcomes they already need, like waste management and wildfire prevention, and CDR occurs as a co-product or by-product. The primary demand driver in this case does not need to be climate benefit; CDR demand can be generated alongside other priorities. The section below shows where it is already happening and where it could scale next.
The symbiosis between biochar, BECCS, BiCRS, forest management, and wildfire prevention in the West Coast of the United States is an example of demand for CDR interventions beyond CDR crediting. Using the waste biomass from forest thinning as a feedstock for biochar or other BiCRS methods provides an avenue for local governments to mitigate wildfire risk and manage waste, while also delivering CDR. For example, Placer County in California has negotiated a deal with CDR company Biochar Now to allow the company to create a facility in the county, in which the company will use the county’s waste biomass from wildfire reduction efforts. Similarly, the US Forest Service, the National Forest Foundation, and CDR company Charm Industrial are partnering to pilot the use of biomass from forest thinning to create bio-oil in the Inyo National Forest, California.
This use case for CDR has the potential to scale up across the US West Coast as wildfire prevention efforts increase. Biochar, BECCS, BiCRS, and forest management as a method for handling forest waste may also spread across the wider United States. The Wildfire Reduction and Carbon Removal Act of 2025 (S. 1842) was introduced at the federal level and proposes a tax credit for CDR from forest residues for wildfire management, potentially offering key support for scale-up.
CDR can support the development of novel waste management solutions for municipal solid waste. An example of this is Vaulted Deep’s Great Plains Facility in Kansas, which takes biosolid waste from multiple municipalities such as the City of Derby, Kansas for disposal in the form of a slurry deep underground. This use case provides an alternative to landfills for governments to manage waste. In some jurisdictions, new rules preventing land application of biosolids containing PFAS have led to increased pressure on landfills and increased costs for biosolids disposal. The need for alternative biosolids disposal methods can also help build significant investment in, capacity for, and deployment of CDR. Revenue from CDR can make innovative waste management pathways economically accessible to municipalities in need of solutions.
Waste management may be a future challenge for many municipalities in the United States, especially as some regions like the Northeast expect to face future landfill constraints and rising costs due to PFAS management. Providing alternative ways to manage biosolid waste offers another lever for some BiCRS companies to pull to help scale up CDR capacity.
Mine tailing management can provide a path for surficial mineralization deployment, especially to manage hazardous waste. For example, carbonating mining waste can immobilize waste — reducing the risk of metals leaching and improving pit lake water quality while also removing and storing CO2. Some mining companies and CDR suppliers are already beginning to explore this strategy. This potential synergy between environmental protection and carbon removal is particularly relevant for countries with large mining industries, such as Canada.
Canada regulates the environmental impact of mines at both the federal and provincial levels, and the mining industry has already made sustainability a focus. The Mining Association of Canada, for example, has developed a Towards Sustainable Mining Tailings Management Protocol, with a goal to minimize risks and harms of tailings both physically and chemically. Surficial mineralization and ex-situ mineralization are tools mining companies could use to manage the environmental risks of mine tailings, and explicit recognition of this in Canada’s mine tailing protocols can help build capacity and deployment for this CDR pathway.
Enhanced weathering for agriculture in Brazil could be an opportunity to build CDR capacity for multiple reasons. Firstly, Brazil has a strong agricultural industry, with substantial land and fertilizer use for agriculture within the country, representing a significant potential scale of deployment. Secondly, the country amended an existing law with its Law No. 12.890 to categorize soil remineralizers, or minerals that have been reduced in size and that affect soil fertility, as inputs to agriculture, which can allow for the application of some rock powders to soil as fertilizer. Thirdly, a high proportion of soils in Brazil are acidic, potentially catalyzing the use of alkaline minerals to aid in soil pH management.
Research on the potential for alkaline materials to improve soil health and crop yields in Brazil is already underway, and the government could continue to support enhanced weathering as a way to improve agricultural practices. Government-supported enhanced weathering demand could take multiple forms, but one potential avenue would be through a pay-for-practice program. In this case, the government could pay farmers to perform pH management to support soil health, during which CDR also occurs, incentivizing enhanced weathering to advance alongside Brazil’s agricultural industry. This use case is not only relevant for Brazil. Other geographies with large amounts of farmland in need of pH management could consider adopting enhanced rock weathering pay-for-practice programs.
CDR offtake can be a part of many products and services in addition to the opportunities presented above. Exhibit 13 below shows examples of how CDR is additional to a product or service across the portfolio of CDR pathways, illuminating pathways to advancing CDR technology development and deployment while also advancing other aims and priorities.
Conclusion
CDR demand is emerging in more forms than just credits — and that diversity is a strength. Credits have been the first and, so far, dominant demand signal, but this brief highlights two additional demand signals that are already gaining traction: demand embedded in differentiated, lower-emissions products (through carbon accounting, procurement, standards, and product labels), and “flipping the script” by purchasing products and services where CDR is a valuable co-product or by-product rather than the primary reason for spending.
The CDR ecosystem now needs to amplify these emergent demand signals into the bankable offtake and scaled investment needed for the meaningful and sustained commercialization and deployment of a range of valuable interventions. When demand lags supply, high-quality projects stall, companies fail, and the real-world testing and learning needed to identify what works and what doesn’t, to reduce costs, and to improve performance slows. Expanding the set of credible demand pathways and broadening the set of actors willing to participate can help close this gap by providing more ways to monetize, more reasons to buy, and more durable market pull across a portfolio of approaches.
Importantly, scaled CDR demand will not come only from large, slow-moving policy mechanisms, nor from a small number of voluntary credit buyers. Near-term opportunities exist to build demand for credits, for differentiated products, and for services that deliver CDR as a co-product or by-product. The next step is to intentionally develop and replicate these pathways. The following actions could be taken to support and expand each trend identified in this brief:
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Scale credit-based purchasing (Trend 1): Grow both voluntary and compliance purchasing of CDR credits, through new programs to aggregate advance market commitments and procurements and, where appropriate, integrating high-durability CDR credits into compliance regimes (e.g., as eligible offsets in ETSs).
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Accelerate differentiated product pull (Trend 2): Enable low-carbon procurement by strengthening product-level carbon accounting, verification, and policies (e.g., Buy Clean) that values in-chain CDR and lower-embodied-emissions materials.
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Replicate “flip-the-script” models (Trend 3): Scale the “flip-the-script" model by packaging it into solutions that tap into a wider range of budgets, e.g., for waste management, wildfire risk mitigation, mine tailings management, and water and soil management, and by using repeatable procurement templates across geographies.
This work was made possible by the Climate Pathfinders Foundation. We express our gratitude to the Foundation for their support.